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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, encryption was done through the use of a shared secret, using
one of many types of symmetric key encryption (SKE), in which encryption and
decryption use the same, shared key. With the advent of long distance communi-
cation between computers, it became necessary to communicate securely between
two parties that did not necessarily have a previously agreed upon secret. A so-
lution to this problem was devised by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman who
introduced the notion of public key encryption (PKE), where two keys exist, one
for encryption and a second key for decryption. This provided a strong level of
security, but implementations by Diffie and Hellman [4] and Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman [5] and others were extremely inefficient, to the point where the slower
encryption and decryption speeds made public key encryption schemes impractical
for use with large quantities of data. To illustrate, benchmarks of the most popular
public key and symmetric key encryption schemes (RSA and AES, respectively)
using OpenSSL version 1.0 on an Intel Core 2 6700 processor put the PKE scheme
RSA throughput at 778.1 kb/s and SKE scheme AES throughput at 1136 Mb/s. So
in this implementation the public key scheme operates at less than one thousandth
of the speed of the symmetric encryption scheme.
Hybrid encryption, as described in 1985 by Varadharajan and Sanders [6],
provides a solution where public key encryption is used to establish a shared secret,
which can then be used as the key for a much faster, more efficient symmetric key
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encryption scheme. Hybrid encryption was in common use for a long time, but re-
sisted formal analysis until 2003 when Cramer and Shoup successfully proved that
a hybrid scheme using two encryption schemes that were secure against chosen ci-
phertext attacks (algorithms that are secure even if the adversary is able to request
decryption of chosen ciphertext values) [1]. In 2005, Abe, et al [2] proved that by
adding extra information in the form of a tag, security against chosen ciphertext
atacks (CCA security), considered to be the strongest form of security for an en-
cryption algorithm, is not necessary for the symmetric encryption scheme and a
more relaxed requirement is sufficient.
In this thesis, we generalize hybrid encryption to the concept of the PK-
hybrid scheme, which is an encryption scheme that uses public key encryption as
a component in a larger, more complex scheme such as the hybrid secret sharing
scheme used in Generalized Non-Interactive Oblivious Transfer (GNIOT), described
later in this thesis. We then prove that we can limit the possible advantage of an
attacker by comparing the PK-Hybrid scheme with a slightly modified version of
itself against which the possible advantage is simpler to calculate.
1.1 Basic Terms
Cryptographic systems, or cryptosystems, are defined in terms of a suite of functions
provided by the system which depend on a security parameter λ that determines
protocol characteristics such as key size. Keysize is the size of the key, given in
terms of the length of the key’s binary encoding. Keyspace is the set of possible key
values. The size of the keyspace is the number of possible key values. For example,
if the keysize is 256 bits and all binary strings of length 256 are valid keys, the size
of the keyspace is 2256, as that is the total number of keys that can be represented
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within that keyspace. Plaintext is data that has not been encrypted, such as ASCII
characters or HTML form data, although it can also be unstructured binary data.
Ciphertext is plaintext that has been modifed through some encryption scheme.
Note that throughout this thesis, we are assuming that plaintexts and keyspaces
are efficiently samplable.
1.2 Encryption
Symmetric Key Encryption
Symmetric key encryption (SKE) is an encryption scheme that has 3 functions:
KeyGen(1λ) 1, Encrypt(k, p), and Decrypt(k, c). KeyGen returns a key k with
the size being determined by λ. In the theoretical model, keysize can be arbitrarily
long, but in practice many SKE implementations have restrictions on what are valid
values for λ — for example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) requires key-
sizes of 128, 192, or 256 bits. In this thesis, as is common practice in cryptography,
we assume all algorithms support arbitrarily long keys, so we consider something
like AES only in an extension that supports longer keys. Encrypt : K × P → C
takes a key k from keyspace K and a plaintext value p ∈ P and returns cipher-
text c ∈ C. Likewise, Decrypt : K × C → P takes the key k and a ciphertext c
and returns a plaintext p. Encrypt and Decrypt are inverses of each other, that is,
Decrypt(k,Encrypt(k, p)) will return p. In addition to AES, other examples of SKE
systems include the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and most pre-computing ci-
phers such as the Vigenère Cipher. We can refer to an SKE cryptosystem by a triple
that represents these three algorithms, such as S = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt).
1As is standard practice in cryptography, the security parameter is given as a unary representation
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Public Key Encryption
Public Key Encryption (PKE), also known as Asymmetric Encryption is an encryp-
tion scheme is also defined by three functions: KeyGen(1λ) : 1∗ → PU ×PR where
PU is the public keyspace and PR is the private keyspace, Encrypt : PU×P → C,
and Decrypt : PR × C → P . However, unlike in symmetric encryption there are
two keys. One key (the “public key”) is used for encryption while the other key
(the “private key”) is used for decryption. Once again, we can represent a PKE
cryptosystem as a triple, S = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt).
Hybrid Encryption
Hybrid encryption refers to the practice of using a PKE scheme to create a shared
secret between two parties that can then be used as the key to an SKE scheme,
usually referred to in this context as the Data Encryption Mechanism (DEM). It
came into practice because while PKE could be used where two parties did not
have a shared secret, it is much slower than SKE and impractical for the amount of
data needed for modern online communications. Despite being in widespread use,
hybrid encryption resisted a formal security proof for a long period until Cramer
and Shoup [1] first published a proof in 2003.
Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is the idea of taking a secret and breaking it into pieces, or shares,
which can then be used to reconstruct the secret. Brickells [7] defined secret sharing
as follows. Consider a secret s. The dealer who holds this secret creates a set of
shares of s and distributes them to a set of n participants. Let Γ be a set of subsets
of the participants. A secret sharing scheme for Γ is a method of distributing shares
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to each member of n such that any subset of participants that is an element of Γ
can reconstruct the secret, while any subset of participants that is not an element
of Γ cannot. If any subset of participants that is not an element of Γ cannot
determine any information about the secret, then the secret sharing scheme is said
to be perfect. Secret sharing schemes were first constructed by Blakley [8] and
Shamir [9]. They created what are called threshold schemes because given n shares,
there is some k such that any set of k shares is sufficent to reconstruct the secret.
The simplest example of this is as follows:
Consider a key that we want to split into two shares, both of which will be
needed to recreate the key. We can randomly generate the first share, and then to
obtain the second share we use an XOR operation to combine the first share and
the key, which produces the second share. Both shares, XORed together will create
the original key, but possessing only one share provides no information about the
key because all valid values for the key are equally valid. As an example consider
the key 1001001001 and the first share which we will choose to be 0100100111. The
XOR operation provides us with the second share: 1101101110. Using XOR to
combine the two shares produces the original key, but note that either share by
itself can be used as the share for any other key by XORing the share with the new
key. Thus, since no information can be obtained from a single share, we say that
this is a secret sharing scheme with perfect security.
PK-Hybrid
We define a PK-hybrid scheme as any cryptosystem where public key encryption
is used as a component in a larger, more complex cryptosystem. Standard hybrid
encryption, as described above, is an example of this, as is a scheme where PKE
is used to encrypt shares from a secret sharing scheme, as in the GNIOT scheme
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described later. As an example, consider an online game whose victory condition
involves reconstructing a secret that has been broken into shares. Each share is
encrypted with a public key scheme, and as the player satisfies game conditions, he
may make decryption requests from the central server, which sends plaintext shares
to the user. In this example, the security of the game system as a whole requires
that the PKE-encrypted shares provide no advantage to the player.
Contributions of this thesis
The work in this thesis provides several contributions to the cryptographic research
literature, which we list below:
• We define the concept of a PK-hybrid scheme, which is a different, broader
way of looking at hybrid encryption and similar cryptosystems.
• We present a powerful lemma that can be used to prove the security of a
PK-hybrid system more easily than has been done in the past.
• We make improvements to a previously published protocol for GNIOT due to
Gunupudi and Tate, and use our new security framework to correct a subtle
error in the original security proof provided for GNIOT.
Outline
Chapter II introduces terms and concepts necessary to understand the main body
of the thesis. Chapter III introduces the concept of a plaintext randomization of a
PKE security scheme and states the main lemma of this thesis. The lemma is then
used to prove the security of standard hybrid encryption. Chapter IV reproduces
the concept of Generalized Non-Interactive Oblivious Transfer from Gunupudi and
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Tate [3] and provides an improved solution and proof using the new framework we
introduced in Chapter III. Chapter V summarizes the contributions of this thesis
and describes further work to be done.
7
CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter we present formal definitions related to the security of cryp-
tosystems that we discuss in this chapter. For more extensive coverage, the reader
is referred to a recent text on cryptography such as the series by Goldreich [10] or
the textbook by Katz and Lindell [11].
2.1 Formal Security
This section provides basic terminology and concepts from modern cryptography,
focused on basic encryption techniques.
Terms
When describing cryptosystems, security is often defined in terms of a game between
two parties which are referred to as the adversary and the oracle. An Oracle is an
algorithm that runs the game and has information or capabilities that the adversary
does not have access to. It is important to note that the oracle is a separate
party and the adversary does not duplicate the functionality. A standard type of
oracle when describing a cryptosystem is an encryption oracle which would have one
function, O.Encrypt(· · ·) where the function would take some number of variables
including a plaintext to be encrypted. Likewise, a decryption oracle would have the
functionO.Decrypt(· · ·) and would take a ciphertext input. When talking about the
security of a cryptosystem against an attacker, we call the attacker the Adversary.
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Games
Security of cryptosystems is often defined in terms of a game between a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary and a game oracle. The oracle sets internal,
persistent state variables, and answers queries for the adversary. The game is defined
in terms of the interface to the game oracle, as a set of functions of the following
form.
• G.Initialize(λ): Sets up persistent variables that are maintained throughout
the game. Typically this can involve generating a random key, and picking a
random bit that the adversary will be tasked with guessing.
• G.OracleQuery(): One or more functions are defined that allow the adversary
to query the oracle.
• G.IsWinner(a): Takes a value a from the adversary at the end of the game,
and returns true or false depending on whether the adversary’s answer a is a
winning answer.
As an example, one version of security for symmetric encryption systems is
referred to as indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (written “IND-
CPA security”), which for an SKE system S = (KenGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is defined
with the following game.
• SKE-CPAS.Initialize(λ): The oracle generates an SKE key k = S.KeyGen(1λ)
and picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• SKE-CPAS.Encrypt(x): The oracle sets c = S.Encrypt(k, x) and returns c to
the adversary.
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• SKE-CPAS.Challenge(x0, x1): The oracle sets c = Encrypt(k, xb) and returns
c to the adversary. Challenge may only be called once — any further calls
return null.
• SKE-CPAS.IsWinner(g): Takes a bit g from the adversary, and returns true if
and only if g = b.
The adversary is given access to S.KeyGen and S.Encrypt and is allowed
to call each of them polynomially many times at any point during the game. The
game itself progresses as follows:
1. O calls S.KeyGen(λ) and randomly chooses bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. The adversary may make polynomially many calls to Encrypt and may make
any calculations it wishes.
3. A chooses 2 plaintext values (x0, x1) and sends them to the oracle O. These
are the challenge plaintexts.
4. O calls S.Encrypt(xb, k).
5. The encrypted value c is returned to A. This is the ciphertext.
6. A can make additional encryption queries and any calculations it wishes and
then outputs guess g.
7. A wins if g = b.
Since it is trivial to design an adversary that can win the SKE game 50%
of the time by simply guessing randomly, we talk about the adversary’s advantage
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against the game. The advantage of A against game G, written AdvA,G is the
following:
AdvA,G = |P (A wins )−
1
2
|
That is to say, the difference of the probability of the adversary winning and
1
2
, the probability of winning by random chance. It is an absolute value because an
adversary that consistently loses can be trivially converted into one that wins by
using it as normal and simply inverting the guess. The advantage against arbitrary
probabilistic polynomial adversaries is bounded by AdvG, which is defined as
AdvG = supA(AdvA,G)
where the supremum is taken over all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries.
Perfect Security
Perfect Security is the term for a cryptosystem where the best possible advantage for
the adversary is zero. That is, where it is not possible to obtain better results than
random chance. In this thesis we discuss secret sharing, where perfect security is
possible to achieve. The simplest example of this is the XOR based 2-of-2 threshold
secret sharing scheme discussed above which has perfect security. Note that in the
example an adversary trying to break the scheme has no information about the
unknown share — until meeting the threshold every possible value is still equally
valid.
Negligable Security
In cryptography it is usually not possible to achieve perfect security — many games
can be won if the adversary knows a secret key known to the oracle, and in these
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cases it may be possible for the adversary to simply guess the key value to win
the game. Consider an adversary A that plays the IND-CPA SKE game presented
above against a cryptosystem with keyspace K = {0, 1}λ. A plays by randomly
generating a key value, trying a decryption, and then either outputting the correct
answer (if the decryption succeeds) or randomly guessing (if the decryption fails).
The probability that A guesses the key correctly is 2−λ, so in this example the
advantage AdvA,SKE = 2
−λ. Thus, when discussing most cryptosystems instead of
perfect security our goal is a system in which the advantage is negligable. Since in
the theoretical model all keysizes can increase indefinitely, we consider the security of
an algorithm as a function of keysize. The formal definition of a negligible function
is a function f(λ) : Z→ R such that for every positive integer c0 there exists integer
c1 such that for all λ > c1,
|f(λ)| < 1
λc0
For example, 1
2λ
is negligable, but 1
λ2
is not.
2.2 Other Notions of Security
When discussing the security of a cryptosystem, there are standardised notionsls of
security that have been developed. The two that are relevant to us are CPA-security
(which was defined previously) and CCA-security. The definitions are presented
with respect to symmetric encryption, but the conversion to public key schemes is
trivial.
IND-CCA Security for Symmetric Encryption
Chosen ciphertext security is defined similarly to chosen plaintext security, but with
the addition of a decryption oracle. For this to be sensible, the decryption oracle
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cannot allow the adversary to request decryption of the challenge ciphertext, so this
is reflected in the definition.
• SKE-CCAS.Initialize(λ): The oracle generates an SKE key k = S.KeyGen(1λ),
picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and sets cc (for “challenge ciphertext”) to null.
• SKE-CCAS.Encrypt(x): The oracle sets c = S.Encrypt(k, x) and returns c to
the adversary.
• SKE-CCAS.Decrypt(x): If x = cc, return null to the adversary. Otherwise, the
oracle sets p = S.Decrypt(k, x) and returns p to the adversary.
• SKE-CCAS.Challenge(x0, x1): The oracle sets persistent state variable cc =
S.Encrypt(k, xb) and returns cc to the adversary. Challenge may only be called
once — any further calls return null.
• SKE-CCAS.IsWinner(g): Takes a bit g from the adversary, and returns true if
and only if g = b.
The Left-Right PKE Game
The left-right PKE game (LR-PKE), presented in [12] is similar to standard CCA
games with a few modifications to allow for multiple, consistent challenge encryp-
tions. The name comes from the fact that the challenge call consistently encrypts
either the left or right argument, and the task of the adversary is to decide which
it is.
• LR-CCAS.Initialize(λ): The oracle generates an SKE key k = S.KeyGen(1λ),
picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets C as a set of null challenge ciphertexts
that is allowed to grow polynomially large.
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• LR-CCAS.Encrypt(x): The oracle sets c = S.Encrypt(k, x) and returns c to the
adversary.
• LR-CCAS.Decrypt(x): If x ∈ C, return null to the adversary. Otherwise, the
oracle sets p = S.Decrypt(k, x) and returns p to the adversary.
• LR-CCAS.Challenge(x0, x1): The oracle calculates c = S.Encrypt(k, xb), adds c
to C, and returns c to the adversary. Challenge may be called polynomially
many times.
• LR-CCAS.IsWinner(g): Takes a bit g from the adversary, and returns true if
and only if g = b.
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CHAPTER III
PK-HYBRID PROTOCOLS
In this chapter we introduce the key concept behind our improved approach
to PK-hybrid protocol analysis, the notion of plaintext randomization. This allows
us to state and prove a powerful lemma for proving security of PK-hybrid cryp-
tosystems.
3.1 Plaintext Randomizations and PK-Hybrids
Consider an adversary A that plays a generic game G against oracle O that uses
CCA-secure PKE encryption scheme S0. Consider the following modifications to S0
which we will refer to as the plaintext randomization of S0, and denote S1:
• When S1.Encrypt(pk, x) is called, S1 creates c = PKEpk(y) where y is a
randomly generated, valid plaintext of the same length as x. S1 stores the
tuple (c, x) and returns c.
• When S1.Decrypt(sk, c) is called, S1 returns x if (c, x) is stored and decrypts
normally otherwise.
Let us refer to the game using S0 as G
S0 and the game using S1 as G
S1 .
Lemma 3.1.1 Let G be a game that uses a public key encryption scheme S0 and
let S1 be the plaintext randomization of S0. Then, for any probabilistic polnomial
time adversary A, |AdvA,GS0 − AdvA,GS1 | ≤ 2AdvLRS0
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Proof:
Let us construct A′ that plays the standard LR-PKE game against oracle OLR.
During intialization, OLR chooses bit b to determine right or left. Let A be the
adversary from the theorem statement that plays game G against OG using PKE
encryption scheme S0 which is being simulated by A
′. Whenever there is a call
S0.Encrypt(pk, x), A
′ does the following:
• A′ generates random plaintext value y
• A′ submits (x, y) as a plaintext pair to OLRS0 for encryption.
• A′ receives ciphertext c from OLRS0 and stores (x, c)
• A′ continues its simulation of OG using c as the output from S0.Encrypt
When there is a valid call to decryption function S0.Decrypt(pk, y), A
′ returns x if
(x, y) is stored, and performs the decryption normally otherwise. When A outputs
its final value such as a guess g, A′ determines whether or not A wins in its simulated
game G. Finally,
• If A wins, A′ outputs “left” (guessing that b = 0)
• If A loses, A′ outputs “right” (guessing that b = 1)
Thus, A′ wins if A wins and b = 0, or if A loses and b = 1.
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If b = 0 then A was playing GS0 and if b = 1 then A was playing GS1 .
Therefore, the probability that A′ wins is as follows:
P (A′ wins ) =
1
2
P (A wins |b = 0) + 1
2
P (A loses |b = 1)
=
1
2
(P (A wins |b = 0) + 1
2
(1− P (A wins |b = 1))
=
1
2
+
1
2
P (A wins |b = 0)− 1
2
P (A wins |b = 1)
Since AdvA′,LR = |P (A′ wins − 12)|, we know that
AdvLR ≥ |
1
2
P (A wins |b = 0)− 1
2
P (A wins |b = 1)|
Thus
|P (A wins | b = 0)− P (A wins | b = 1)| ≤ 2AdvLR
If b = 0, A is playing GS0 and therefore
P (A wins | b = 0) = P (A wins against GS0)
Likewise, if b = 1, A is playing GS1 and therefore
P (A wins | b = 0) = P (A wins against GS1)
Since for all a and b, ||a| − |b|| ≤ |a − b|, we can bound |AdvA,GS0 − AdvA,GS1 | =
||P (A wins | b = 0) − 1
2
| − |P (A wins | b = 1) − 1
2
|| ≤ |P (A wins | b = 0) −
P (A wins | b = 1)| and by the above bound we can say:
|AdvA,GS0 − AdvA,GS1 | ≤ 2AdvLR
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3.2 Standard Hybrid Encryption
To demonstrate the use of this lemma, we use it to prove standard hybrid encryption:
Theorem 3.2.1 If T is a CCA-secure symmetric encryption scheme and S0 is a
CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme with CCA advantages given by AdvCCAT
and AdvCCAS0 respectively, then the hybrid encryption system HS0,T that combines
the PKE and SKE encryption schemes is CCA-secure with advantage bounded by
AdvCCAH ≤ 2AdvLRS0 + AdvCCAT
Proof:
Let HS0,T (x) represent the plaintext x protected by H using PKE scheme S0 and
SKE scheme T , and let S1 be the plaintext randomization of S0. HS1,T (x) therefore
consists of a random, useless key and the SKE encryption of the plaintext x with a
random, independent key. Since the PKE data contains no information about the
SKE encryption (unlike in the standard game where it would contain the encrypted
SKE key), we can say that breaking HS1,T (x) is equivalent to breaking the SKE
scheme. Thus the advantage against HS1,T (x) is
AdvHS1,T (x) ≤ AdvT
By lemma 3.1.1 we know that
|AdvA,HS0,T − AdvA,HS1,T | ≤ 2AdvLRS0
as before we can limit bound this as
||AdvA,HS0,T | − |AdvA,HS1,T || ≤ 2AdvLRS0
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and therefore
|AdvA,HS0,T | ≤ 2AdvLRS0 + AdvT
19
CHAPTER IV
GNIOT
Gunupudi and Tate [3] defined the Generalized Oblivious Transfer (GOT)
and Generalized Non-Interactive Oblivious Transfer (GNIOT) problems which are
useful in many secure function evaluation applications, such as supporting secure
mobile agents. In this thesis we use the same basic problem definitions but provide
an improved solution and security proof.
4.1 Basic Definitions
The basic definitions from Gunupudi and Tate are reproduced below.
Definition 4.1.1 (GOT) Define λ as the security parameter and ld as the length
of the data items being sent by Alice to Bob. Assume that Alice has n data sets
S1, S2, · · · , Sn, with values xi,j ∈ {0, 1}ld for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi},
and parameters k1, k2, . . . , kn, where 1 ≤ ki ≤ mi. At the end of the GOT execution,
Bob will have either no result (represented by ⊥) or a set of exactly ki values of his
choice from each set Si, for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
We will need to refer to sets of indices into the data set, so define index set
I to be a set of indices (i, j), and define I(i) = {j | (i, j) ∈ I}. With respect to the
parameters provided in an instance of GOT, we say that index set I is well-formed
if |I(i)| = ki for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We define GNIOT as a set of operations which perform GOT, but accomplish
this task without requiring any interaction between the receiver and any other party
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after the receiver decides which values he wants. For maximum flexibility, allowing
either batched or individual decryptions, we define the decryption operation as a
stateful process which is called repeatedly — only at the very end are we required
to have the actual plaintext values.
Definition 4.1.2 (GNIOT) Generalized Non-Interactive Oblivious Transfer con-
sists of the following phases, which provide a solution to the GOT problem.
Setup Phase. This phase involves key generation. Given security parameter λ,
the key generation algorithm returns
(Kp, Ks)← Setup(1λ)
where Kp is the public key information, and Ks is the secret key information.
Transmit Phase. This phase transforms the set of values xi,j ∈ {0, 1}ld for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi} into a data blob which can be transmitted
to the receiver. Specifically,
C ← TransmitKp

〈k1, x1,1, x1,2, · · · , x1,m1〉 ,
〈k2, x2,1, x2,2, · · · , x2,m2〉 ,
...
〈kn, xn,1, xn,2, · · · , xn,mn〉
 .
Decrypt Phase. In this phase, the receiver gives the indices (i, j) of the xi,j values
that he wishes to receive. The state-based process begins by calculating the
initial state S0 ← InitialState(C), and then evolving the state and providing
answers to queries as
(tk, Sk)← DecryptKs(Sk−1, C, ik, jk),
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for k = 1, 2, . . . , q for some number of queries q. We require that index infor-
mation be embedded in tk such that there is a function “ind” that extracts this
information as
(ik, jk)← ind(tk).
PostProcess Phase. This phase takes the results of the Decrypt calls and either
fails (giving ⊥ as the result) or produces q plaintext values as
〈v1, v2, . . . , vq〉 ← PostProcess(t1, t2, · · · , tq)
4.2 Security Game for GNIOT
In the GNIOT game, adversary A sends a set of plaintext challenge texts arranged
as a set of n rows of mi pairs each. The oracleO independently chooses one plaintext
from each pair and calls Transmit with the chosen values. The adversary is allowed
to make ki decrypt queries for each row i, and at the end attempts to guess the bit
corresponding to any challenge pair that Decrypt was not requested on.
• GNIOT.Initialize(λ): Call Setup and get (Kp, Ks) and randomly choose bits
r ∈ {0, 1} and bi,j ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi. Finally, for each i set
ki.
• GNIOT.Challenge(X): X is a set of plaintext challenge pairs in the following
format:
X =
 (x
0
1,1, x
1
1,1) · · · (x01,m, x11,m1)
· · · · · · · · ·
(x0n,1, x
1
n,1) · · · (x0n,m, x1n,mn)

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Using the input it constructs
X ′ =
 ki x
b1,1
1,1 · · · x
b1,m
1,m
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
ki x
bn,1
n,1 · · · xbn,mn,m

It then calls TransmitKp(X
′).
• GNIOT.Decrypt(i, j): Calls Decrypt(i, j)
• GNIOT.IsWinner(i, j, g): Returns true if GNIOT.Decrypt(i, j) has not
been called and g = bi,j. Returns false otherwise.
1. Oracle O initializes the game by calling S.KeyGen and randomly choosing
r ∈ {0, 1} and bi,j ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi.
2. A chooses plaintext pairs
 (x
0
1,1, x
1
1,1) · · · (x01,m, x11,m1)
· · · · · · · · ·
(x0n,1, x
1
n,1) · · · (x0n,m, x1n,mn)

3. O generates and returns C where
C =
 (c1,1, c1,1) · · · (c1,m, c1,m1)· · · · · · · · ·
(cn,1, cn,1) · · · (cn,m, cn,mn)

and ci,j = S.Encrypt(pk, x
bi,j
i,j ).
4. A is allowed to decrypt ki values on each line.
5. A is free to perform any computations using the information it obtained.
6. A outputs guess g and an index i, j.
7. A wins if g = r.
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4.3 Improved Solution
In this section we provide an improved solution to the GNIOT problem that uses
our PK-hybrid framework to enable a simpler proof than in the original. S refers to
the PKE scheme in use and T refers to the SKE scheme. In addition, the original
solution embedded encrypted data inside the PKE, limiting the size of the data.
• GNIOT.Setup(λ): Call S.KeyGen(λ) receiving (pk, sk). Return (pk, sk).
• GNIOT.Transmit(X):
1. Choose key R, which is broken into n of n shares R1, · · ·, Rn using a
perfect secret sharing scheme.
2. Create keys ki,j and breaks each into 2 shares using a perfect secret
sharing scheme so that the shares of ki,j are R and some Ri,j.
3. Each Ri is broken into ki of mi shares si,1, · · ·, si,mi using a perfect secret
sharing scheme.
4. Return C =
 (PKE(s1,1, R1,1), SKEk1,1(x1,1)) · · · (PKE(s1,m, R1,m1), SKEk1,m1(x1,m1))· · · · · · · · ·
(PKE(sn,1, Rn,1), SKEkn,1(xn,1)) · · · (PKE(sn,m, Rn,mn), SKEkn,mn(xn,mn))

• GNIOT.Decrypt(i, j): Returns t = (i, j, xbi,ji,j ) if less than ki decryptions have
been called on row i. Returns null otherwise.
• GNIOT.PostProcess(T ): Takes a set of Decrypt outputs T of size q and
outputs plaintext values (x1, x2, · · · , xq).
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4.4 Security Proof
The security proof provided by Gunupudi and Tate had a subtle error in one case
of the proof. Using the framework provided by this thesis allows us to develop a
simpler and corrected proof.
Theorem 4.4.1 Given an adversary A that plays an unmodified version of the
GNIOT game, GS0, AdvA,GS0 ≤ 2AdvLR + AdvSKE.
Proof:
Let us consider the GNIOT game as 2 distinct oracles, the main game oracle and
the PKE encryption/decryption oracle S0. Let us also consider a modified PKE
oracle S1 and an adversary A that attacks the GNIOT game.We will represent the
two games as GS0 and GS1 respectively.
The attacker is attempting to gain information about data that is protected
by the SKE scheme. The key to the SKE scheme is protected by secret sharing, and
the shares are protected by the PKE scheme. Since the secret sharing schemes in
use are perfect, the attacker gains no advantage from obtaining a set of shares that
does not meet the threshold to recreate the key. In game GS1 , the key to the SKE
scheme is broken into shares, but those shares are not provided to the attacker even
in encrypted form, thus AdvA,GS1 ≤ AdvSKE. That is to say, the key cannot be
recreated even if the PKE scheme were to be broken, thus the attacker’s advantage
is at best the best possible advantage against the SKE encryption scheme. Since
the SKE scheme is CCA-secure, AdvSKE is negligable and therefore so is AdvA,GS1 .
By Theorem 3.1.1 we know that
|AdvA,GS0 − AdvA,GS1 | ≤ 2AdvLR
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As was shown above, this is equivalent to
|AdvA,GS0 − AdvSKE| ≤ 2AdvLR
Therefore
AdvA,GS0 ≤ 2AdvLR + AdvSKE
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this thesis we defined the concept of a PK-hybrid scheme and used this as
a broader, more flexible framework to be applied to cyptosystems that incorporate
PKE. We also proved a powerful lemma that, combined with our new framework,
can be used a general tool for proving the security of PK-hybrid cryptosystems more
easily than has been done in the past, and as an example proved that the standard
hybrid encryption technique is CCA-secure if the component cryptosystems (PKE
and SKE) are CCA-secure. Finally, we made improvements to the work previously
published by Gunupudi and Tate [3] using our new framework to construct a simpler
solution that is easier to prove secure.
Future work includes creating a stronger version of the lemma that restricts
the advantage against the PK-hybrid cryptosystem by AdvCCA−PKE instead of
AdvLR−PKE. Using this, we could unify results that compare advantage of LR to
CCA with our PK-hybrid framework. Also, the original GNIOT paper used trusted
computing hardware capabilities, and work could be done putting this work into
that context. Finally, the secret sharing results can be made to be more general,
instead of specific to the GNIOT scheme.
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